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Liability of an Aider and Abettor for Aggravated
Murder in Ohio: State v. Lockett
In State v. Lockett,' which dealt with the liability of an aider and
abettor for a murder committed during a robbery attempt, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the aggravated murder conviction of an accused
who waited outside a pawnshop in a get-away car for the other partici-
pants of a robbery attempt. The Lockett opinion is ambiguous with
respect to a critical issue: Is the subjective intent of a person who helped
to plan a crime during which murder is committed but who was not
present during the slaying essential to her liability as an aider and abet-
tor of aggravated murder? If one interprets the Ohio Supreme Court's
opinion to require a particular state of mind as an element of the crime
of aiding and abetting aggravated murder, the court was equally am-
biguous concerning whether sufficient evidence of defendant's intent had
been produced. This Case Comment will explore alternative interpre-
tations of the Lockett opinion in order to show that (1) the Ohio Su-
preme Court misinterpreted and misapplied Ohio statutory and case
law governing aider and abettor liability for aggravated murder, and
(2) the holding may have violated defendant's corstitutional right to
due process.
1. 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S, Ct. 261 (1977). The
following questions were argued before the United States Supreme Court:
(1) Did prosecutor in summation make impermissible comments on defendant's failure
to testify and thereby violate her rights under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
(2) Do Ohio death penalty statutes place unconstitutional limit; on consideration of
mitigating circumstances? (3) Is death disproportionately severe and unconstitutional
sentence for one who has not taken life, attempted to take life, or actually intended to
take life? (4) Do Ohio death penalty statutes violate Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments in that they deny capitally accused [defendant's] right to judgment of
his peers as to existence of mitigating circumstances and appropriateness of death
penalty? (5) Do Ohio capital sentencing procedures impermissibly penalize exercise of
rights to plead not guilty and to trial by jury? (6) Do Ohio capital sentencing procedures
impermissibly shift to defendant convicted of capital murder with specifications burden
of proving facts that distinguish those who may live from those who must die? (7) Were
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated by insufficiently examined
exclusion for cause of prospective jurors with conscientious scruples against capital
punishment? (8) Did Ohio Supreme Court, by giving retroactive application to new
construction of Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.03(A) governing complicity, deny
defendant's right to fair warning of criminal prohibition and thercby deprive her of her
life in violation of Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
46 U.S.L.W. 3269, 3269-70 (U.S. October 18, 1977) (No. 76-6997).
This Case Comment analyzes the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court as it relates to
defendant's intent in terms of Ohio statutory and case law and federal constitutional standards
to reach the conclusion that Lockett was inappropriately convicted of aggravated murder.
This analysis remains relevant whatever the ultimate disposition of t ic case before the United
States Supreme Court because this precise issue was not argued, but rather the issue of
defendant's intent to kill was presented to the Supreme Court as a basis for holding the Ohio
statutory procedure for imposition of the death penalty to be unconstitutional. This Case
Comment is also relevant in pointing out the Ohio Supreme Court's misinterpretation of Ohio
law, because the Ohio Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its own state law. See, eg..
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107 (3d ed. 1976); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
689 (1975).
AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Sandra Lockett, defendant, was actively involved in planning the
commission of a robbery by initially suggesting it and by earmarking
certain businesses as possible targets. None of the participants had a
gun, but one had a cartridge. Defendant's brother, James Lockett, sug-
gested that they rob a pawn shop where they could ask to see a gun,
load it with the cartridge and use it to effect the robbery. According to
the prearranged plan, Al Parker, James Lockett, and Nathan Dew en-
tered the pawn shop while Sandra Lockett waited outside in a car with
the engine running. Inside the shop, Parker loaded one of the guns he
had asked to examine, put his finger on the trigger, and threatened the
owner. Parker later testified as the State's chief witness that the gun
accidentally went off when the owner grabbed it.
2
Rejecting offers of a negotiated plea,3 Sandra Lockett was charged
with aggravated murder as an aider and abettor. The aggravated mur-
der statute, Ohio Revised Code section 2903.01(B), prohibits individ-
uals from purposely causing "the death of another while committing
or attempting to commit ... aggravated robbery or robbery. ... 4
Purpose to kill is defined by statute as a "specific intention to cause a
certain result."5  The Ohio complicity statute under which defendant
was found guilty as an aider and abettor provides in part: "(A) No per-
son, acting with ihe kind of culpability required for the commission of
an offense, shall do any of the following: .. . (2) Aid or abet another
in committing the offense."6
2. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 53, 358 N.E.2d at 1067.
3. Id. at 51, 358 N.E.2d at 1066.
4. Osno REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page 1975) provides:
(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the
death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another w'hile committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery
or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
5. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (Page 1975) provides:
(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain
result, or when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,
regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention
to engage in conduct of that nature.
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A
person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances
probably exist.
(C) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences,
he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result
or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances
when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known
risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
(D) A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care,
he fails to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a certain result or may
be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances iAhen,
because of a substantial lapse from due care, he fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such
circumstances may exist.
6. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (Page 1975) (emphasis added).
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The jury instruction given by the trial judge did not clearly state
whether the jury was required or merely permitted to find that defen-
dant had manifested an intent to kill by participating in a common plan
to commit a robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. 7 In the first para-
graph of the court's instruction, the judge said that "[a] person engaged
in a common design .. . to rob by force ... is presumed to acqui-
esce" and "is bound by the consequences. . . ." Yet in the second
paragraph the court instructed the jury that if the manner used to ac-
complish the robbery would be reasonably likely to produce death, then
"[a]n intent to kill by an aider and abettor may be found to exist beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . .The jury found defendant guilty of aggra-
vated murder with specifications, and upon a subsequent determination
by the trial court pursuant to Ohio statutory procedure that no mitigat-
ing circumstances were present defendant was sentenced to death.8
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Lockett argued that the
7. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 68, 358 N.E.2d at 1075 (emphasis added). The jury instruction read
in pertinent part:
A person engaged in a common design with others to rob by force and violence
an individual or individuals of their property is presumed to acquiesce in whatever may
reasonably be necessary to accomplish the object of their enterprise. And if under the
circumstances it may be reasonably expected that the victim's life would be in danger by
the manner and means of performing the criminal act inspired each one engaged in
the common design is bound by the consequences naturally or probably arising in its
furtherance.
If the conspired robbery and the manner of its accomplishment would be reasonably
likely to produce death, each plotter is equally guilty with the principal offender as an
aider and abettor in the homicide, even though the aider and abettor was not aware of
the particular weapon used to accomplish the killing. An intent to kill by the aider and
abettor may be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such circumstances,
This jury instruction is almost identical to paragraphs one and two of the syllabus in State v.
Palfy, I1 Ohio App. 2d 142, 229 N.E.2d 76 (Summit County 1967) (syllabus 1, 2).
8. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 51, 258 N.E.2d at 1066. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Ohio statutory procedure for imposition of the death penalty in State
v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976). The statute. that supplies the criteria
for imposition of the death penalty, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page 1975), provides in
relevant part:
(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murdtr is precluded, unless
one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment
pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping,, detection, apprehen-
sion, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping,
rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
(B) Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed
in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment tcnd proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, con-
sidering the nature and circumstances of the offense and history, character, and condi-
tion of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a prepondance
[preponderance] of the evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that
the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
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state had produced insufficient evidence to convict her of aggravated
murder. More specifically, defendant contended that in order for her to
be convicted of aiding and abetting aggravated murder, the state must
prove two propositions: (1) that the principal offender, Al Parker, pos-
sessed purpose to kill, as required by the Ohio aggravated murder statute;
and (2) that the defendant shared in the purpose of the principal, as
required by the Ohio complicity statute. The defendant argued that
the state had failed to prove both propositions beyond a reasonable
doubt. 9
The Ohio Supreme Court apparently accepted the argument that
the principal's intent must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
before a defendant can be convicted as an accomplice to the crime.'0
The court determined that a sufficient basis for a finding of the princi-
pal's purpose to kill existed in evidence presented by the state that Par-
ker had engaged in a common design to commit a felony enumerated in
the aggravated murder statute and that the common design included the
use of an inherently dangerous weapon." The opinion did not clearly
indicate, however, whether the court had determined that the state had
presented sufficient evidence of purpose to kill or, alternatively, had held
that the jury instruction that allowed intent to be presumed was correct
as a matter of law. In the body of the opinion, the court stated that
"[t]he record contains sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find
a purposeful intent to kill. .. . Yet in its syllabus, the court stated
that "a homicide occurring during the commission of the felony is a
natural and probable consequence of the common plan which must be
presumed to have been intended ... .
The most serious ambiguity in the Lockett opinion appears in the
court's discussion of the intent of Sandra Lockett. The court never
satisfactorily resolved the question whether the state was required to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, as well as the prin-
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
For a thorough discussion of the Ohio death penalty provisions, see Comment, The Consti-
tutionality of Ohio's Death Penalty, 38 OHio ST. LJ. 617 (1977).
9. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 58, 358 N.E.2d at 1070.
10. Id. at 59, 358 N.E.2d at 1070.
11. ld.
12. Id. at 60, 358 N.E.2d at 1071 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 48, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 3) (emphasis added). Although syllabus num-
ber three does not state that it refers to the intent of the principal alone, syllabus number four
specifically mentions the intent of the aider and abettor and states that "a purposeful intent to
kill by the aider and abettor may be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such
circumstances." 49 Ohio St. 2d at 49, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 3, 4) (emphasis added).
Assuming that the court would not have addressed the same issue in two consecutive para-
graphs stating antipodal rules, the court must have been referring only to the principal in
syllabus number three.
According to the Ohio Supreme Court decision in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168
Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), whenever there is conflict between the syllabus and the
opinion, the syllabus controls.
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cipal, had purpose to kill. Lockett's attorneys had argued that although
Ohio's prior aiding and abetting statute 4 made no mention of intent,
the legislature created an intent requirement in 1974 when it added the
phrase "acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission
of an offense . . ."15 to the criminal complicity statute. The Ohio
Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument, 6 yet went on to hold
that defendant was "bound by all the consequence:s naturally and prob-
ably arising from the furtherance of the conspiracy to commit the
robbery. The record reflects that this was the case and establishes
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had a purposeful intent to
kill."' 7 This holding is summarized in the syllabus by a statement that
"a purposeful intent to kill by the aider and abettor may be found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such circumstances." Again,
it is unclear whether the court was stating that there was sufficient
evidence upon which the jury could find purpose to kill, or whether the
trial court's instruction creating a presumption of intent to kill was a cor-
rect rule of law based upon the evidence of "the planning and commis-
sion of the robbery and acquiesce[nce] in the use of a deadly weapon to
accomplish the robbery."' 9 Furthermore, the court would have had no
reason to treat the insufficiency of the evidence offered to prove defen-
dant's intent if it had meant to hold that the Ohio criminal complicity
statute requires no proof of the aider and abettor's intent. The court
relied heavily upon prior Ohio case law in reaching its holding, and the
court's inconsistencies can best be examined in the context of this prior
law.
II. THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF OHIO LAW
A. Intent of the Principal
At common law, liability for murder committed during the course
of a robbery was based upon the felony murder rule that was so broad
that its definition has been phrased: "Homicide resulting from any fel-
ony committed in a dangerous way, is murder., 2" Although criminal
liability for felony murder was not predicated upon purpose to kill, the
14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.17 (Page 1954) (current version at Owo RLv. CODO ANN,
§ 2923.03 (Page 1975)): "Any person who aids, abets or procures another to commit an offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."
15. 1974 OHIO LAws 1961 (codified at Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (Page 1975)).
See text accompanying note 7 supra. This language was added to the aider and abettor statute
when the new Ohio Criminal Code was adopted.
16. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 60, 358 N.E.2d at 1071.
17. Id. at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 49, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 4) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072.
20. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969); See also W. LAFAVE & A. Scott,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 71 (1972).
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element of malice, which was a prerequisite of liability for murder, was
said to be constructively, or sometimes impliedly, satisfied by the defen-
dant's intent to commit the underlying felony.21 The scope of a felon's
liability was usually limited to the natural and probable consequences of
the felony.22 The customary rationale for the felony murder rule was
"to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them
strictly responsible for killings they commit. "23 Although almost all states
have codified the common law rule in their present murder statutes, 4
most courts in recent years have viewed the doctrine with disfavor and
have limited it whenever possible.25
The Ohio statute prohibiting murder committed during a felony
departs from the common law rule by requiring that the defendant pos-
sess purpose to kill.26  The Ohio Supreme Court first interpreted an
earlier version of this murder statute in Robbins v. State.27 In Robbins,
a doctor was charged with murder in the death of a young woman to
whom he had administered poison in order to induce an abortion. The
murder statute at that time provided:
That if any person shall purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated
malice, or in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any rape, arson,
robbery, or burglary, or by administering poison, or causing the same to
be done, kill another, every such person shall be deemed guilty of murder
in the first degree, and, upon conviction thereof, shall suffer death.28
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the word "purposely" modified both
the phrases "of deliberate and premeditated malice" and "in the per-
21. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 71.
22. R. PERKINS, supra note 20, at 41. Cf. People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 CaL
Rptr. 598 (1969), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970) (robbers held responsible for victim's death
from heart attack that occurred more than twenty minutes after robbers left scene).
The proximate causation approach has also been used by a minority of jurisdictions to
define the scope of liability for a killing that occurs during a felony by one who was not an actual
participant in the crime, as when the victim shoots a third party and the principal is held
responsible for the crime. In State v. Chambers, 53 Ohio App. 2d 266, 373 N.E.2d 393 (Lorain
County 1977), the defendant and an accomplice were discovered committing a burglary by an
armed homeowner, who mortally wounded the fleeing accomplice; the court held that the
principal burglar could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. See Annot., 56 A.L.R. 3d
239 (1974). Many jurisdictions have expressly refused to extend the felony murder doctrine
this far. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 (1977). California has adopted an
approach under which malice on the part of the defendent is inferred if the defendant initiated
the gun battle and the third party shot back in response. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
23. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 CaL Rptr. 442. 445
(1965).
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970); PA. Coxs. STAT. A%,. tit. 18,
§ 2502 (Purdon 1973).
25. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 (1977).
26. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page 1975), quoted at note 4 supra. For a history of
the felony murder rule in Ohio, see Comment, The Felony Murder Rule in Ohio, 17 Otlo ST.
L.J. 130 (1956).
27. 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857).
28. 1 M. CURWEN, REVISED STATUTES OF O1110 181 (1853).
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petration or attempt to perpetrate any . . . robbery," so that a sub-
jective intent to kill was an essential element of liability under the Ohio
murder statute in all circumstances. 29  The court admitted that the
statutory language was ambiguous and, were it not for the placement of
the comma after "purposely," might have been read consistently with
the common law felony murder rule.30 The Ohio Supreme Court, how-
ever, considered the common law rule a relic of barbarism 31 and inti-
mated that it would have read the requirement of malice into the stat-
ute even if the word "purposely" had been omitted? 2 The court was
greatly influenced by policy considerations and noted that:
If a burglar, in passing through a house he had entered in the night season,
should accidentally and unintentionally upset an article of furniture, or
cause something to fall upon the cradle of a sleeping infant, and thereby
kill the child, he might be subjected to the highest penalties of the statute,
both for manslaughter and for burglary; but to inflict upon him the ex-
treme punishment of death, would evince a disregard of that fundamental
distinction in respect to the relative guilt of human actions, dependent on
the concurrence or non-concurrence of the will with the act, as well as a
disregard of that humane principle of criminal justice by which punish-
ment is graduated in proportion to the atrocity of the crime."
Since Robbins, Ohio courts have generally considered purpose to
be an essential element of the crime of aggravated murder,3 4 and the
Robbins analysis of the Ohio statute was specifically reaffirmed by the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1951 in State v. Farmer.35 In Farmer, the
defendant admitted that he had intended to strike the victim with a
stick, but not rob or kill him.3 6 The Farmer court felt compelled to fol-
low the Robbins interpretation because the Ohio legislature in subse-
quent revisions and reenactments of the murder statute had clarified
its language in accordance with the Robbins opinion, to make intent to
kill an element both of premeditated murder and of murder committed
during the course of a felony.3 7 Despite the express requirement of pur-
pose, however, the Ohio Supreme Court held in Farmer that "one may
29. 8 Ohio St. at 177.
30. Id. at 175-76.
31. Id. at 170.
32. Id. at 178.
33. Id. at 179 (emphasis in original).
34. For cases predicating liability for murder occurring during the commission of a felony
upon intent to commit murder, see Comment, supra note 26, at 133. Cf. State v. Stewart, 176
Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 (1964) (Formation of intent may take place during the attempt,
no matter how short the duration between attempt and execution); State v. Salter, 149 Ohio
St. 264, 78 N.E.2d 575 (1948) (The intentional administration of poison satisfies the intent
requirement for murder.).
35. 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 N.E.2d 11 (1951).
36. Id. at 216, 218, 102 N.E.2d at 13, 14.
37. Id. at 221, 102 N.E.2d at 15.
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be presumed to intend results which are the natural, reasonable, and
probable consequences of his voluntary act. .... 08
Farmer was the basis for the court's holding in Lockett that the
principal's intent to kill was established beyond a reasonable doubt by
evidence that he had participated in a common plan to commit a rob-
bery with the use of a deadly weapon.39 In Farmer, the court dealt
with the question whether the jury had sufficient evidence to infer an
intent to kill from the fact that the defendant had struck the deceased
with a stick.4 0  The Ohio Supreme Court in Farmer held that if the
stick were one reasonably likely to produce death, the defendant could
be presumed to intend the natural and probable results of the beating.4! '
38. Id. at 223, 102 N.E.2d at 16 (emphasis added). For other cases imposing this pre-
sumption of intent, see State v. Fugate, 36 Ohio App.2d 131, 303 N.E.2d 313 (1974) (Intent to kill
may be presumed where the natural and probable consequences of a wrongful act are likely to
produce death, and such factors as the nature of the weapon used, its tendency to destroy life, and
the manner in which the wounds were inflicted are to be taken into consideration); State v.
Cliff, 19 Ohio St. 2d 31, 34, 249 N.E.2d 823, 825 (1969) ("It must be presumed that Cliff intended
the natural consequences of his voluntary act . . . . The natural consequences of a gun, loaded
and cocked, and aimed in the direction of a man, is the discharge thereof and possible resulting
death."); State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 (1964) (Because one is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of voluntary acts, intent to kill can be inferred from
the manner in which the killing was accomplished.) The Farmer rule appears in 4 Ono Jtav
INsTRUcTiONs § 409.01 (Provisional Criminal 1974): "DANGEROUS WEAPON. If a wound is
inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to (destroy life) (Inflict great
bodily harm), the purpose to (kill) (injure) may be inferred from the use of the weapon."
Although the court in Farmer used the term "presumed," it was creating uhat most legal
scholars would call a permissive inference. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF TIIE LW OF
EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK'S]; J. TItATF, PRELtiUtvAlY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 317-26 (1898); 9 J. WIG.sORE, EvIOF e cE § 2490
(3d ed. 1940). See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Th2eory of Presumptions, 52 Mici. L
REv. 195, 204 (1953), in which the author identifies eight senses of the word presumption, one
of which is a "permissive inference." A permissive inference arises %hen a judge, using com-
mon knowledge or ordinary reasoning, determines that a jury might reasonably deduce fact B
from fact A, so that a party's burden of going forward with the evidence is satisfied. McCOit-
MIcK'S, supra note 38, § 342. On the other hand, if a court determines that fact A creates a
presumption of fact B, the establishment of fact B may place a secondary burden of going
forward with the evidence upon the opponent, or may place the burden of persuasion upon
the opponent as well. Id. § 342. The difference between the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuasion (which together are encompassed by the term "burden of proof")
has been explained as follows:
The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the liability to an adverse
ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been pro-
duced....
The burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sus-
tained their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the evidence has been
introduced. . . . The jury must be told that if the party having the burden of persuasion
has failed to satisfy that burden, the issue is to be decided against him.
Id. § 336, at 784.
Presumptions that merely shift the burden of proof are called rebuttable presumptions
because the party against whom the presumption operates will be able to overcome the pre-
sumption with the requisite amount of evidence. Id. § 342. If no evidence could possibly
overcome the presumption, the presumption is said to be irrebuttable or conclusive. The authors
maintain, however, that what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption is
not really a presumption at all, but rather the expression of a rule of law. Id. § 342, at 804.
39. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 59, 358 N.E.2d at 1070.
40. 156 Ohio St. at 222-23, 102 N.E.2d at 20.
41. Id.
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In effect, the jury might disbelieve the defendant's own testimony con-
cerning his intent yet proceed to infer from the objective circumstances
that the requisite intent was present.
The Lockett court held that if an inherently dangerous weapon
were planned to be used, defendant would be liable for the probable
and natural results of the robbery.42 The court did not refer to the
principal's testimony that the gun had discharged accidentally. By
contrast, Farmer must have expended direct physical effort to inflict
the blow; it seems highly unlikely that his act could have been acciden-
tal. The logical relation between use of bodily force and an intent to
kill is intuitively clearer than the relation between use of a gun to ef-
fect a robbery and an intent to kill. Furthermore, the court in Farmer
held that the intent to kill may be presumed, whereas the Lockett court
held in its syllabus that the principal's intent must be presumed.43
The Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of the principal's intent to
kill in Lockett suffers from an additional defect. The Ohio Revised
Code explicitly defines purpose as a "specific intention to cause a cer-
tain result. 4  The Ohio Jury Instructions define purpose as "a deci-
sion of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective of (producing a
specific result) (engaging in specific conduct)."4 5 Yet the court in
Lockett held that there was sufficient evidence of purpose to kill on the
basis of evidence of a common plan to commit robbery with the use of a
weapon likely to produce death.46 Under the Ohio Revised Code, if a
person "disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a
certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature," he satisfies the defi-
nition of recklessness. 47  The actions of Parker and the other parti-
cipants in the robbery seem to evince recklessness rather than pur-
pose to kill. Although a greater degree of culpability will satisfy the
intent requirement for a crime that has a lesser requirement (for exam-
ple, one who is indictable for murder may be convicted of negligent
homicide)48 if the state presents sufficient evidence of purposeful con-
duct,4 9 a lesser degree of intent will not satisfy a statute requiring a
higher degree of culpability.50 The legislature -has -clearly mandated
42. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072.
43. Id. at 48, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 3).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(A) (Page 1975), quoted at note 5 supra.
45. 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 409.01(d) (Provision Crimin.l 1974).
46. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 59, 358 N.E.2d at 1070.
47. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (Page 1975) quoted at note 5 supra.
48. Id. § 2903.05.
49. Id. § 2901.22(E).
50. Id. § 2901.21 provides:
(A) Except as provided in Division (B) of this section, a person is not guilty of an
offense unless both of the following apply:
(1) His liability is based on conduct which includes eith'r a voluntary act, or an
omission to perform an act or duty which he is capable of performing:
[Vol. 39:214
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the requisite state of mind for a conviction of aggravated murder.
Therefore, in permitting evidence of reckless conduct to satisfy the
Ohio aggravated murder statute, the Ohio Supreme Court has reduced
the criteria for purpose contrary to the dictates of the Ohio Revised
Code and has in effect eliminated the requirement of purpose from the
statute.
B. Intent of the Accomplice
Accomplice liability at common law extended to the natural and
probable consequences of the offense planned. 5' The rule is criticized
today for its inconsistency with fundamental principles of the criminal
justice system because it predicates accomplice liability upon negligent
conduct despite the fact that the substantive crime for which the princi-
pal is prosecuted may require a much higher degree of intent to be
proved.52 The broad reach of accomplice liability coupled with the ex-
tensiveness of the general felony murder doctrine has enabled prose-
cutors to sweep all co-felons into a first-degree murder conviction for
any killing in consequence of a planned felony.53 The results in Ohio
cases of aiding and abetting an aggravated murder have been consis-
tent with the rule that an accomplice need not have the specific intent
necessary to find the principal guilty of the same crime. In cases of
aiding and abetting the Ohio courts have generally ignored or presumed
the aider and abettor's intent, or have found the intent requirement of
the aggravated murder statute to be inapplicable to the aider and
abettor.
Huling v. State 4 was the first reported Ohio opinion dealing with
the liability of an aider and abettor for a murder that occurred during the
commission of a felony. The court in Huling found sufficient evidence
of intent to kill in the silence of the participants to a burglary when the
principal threatened the victim's life, and declined to determine
whether the accomplices would be automatically held responsible for a
death resulting from a felony, regardless of their intent.55 The Ohio
(2) He has the requisite degree of culpability for each clement as to %hich a cul-
pable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense.
51. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 65. At common law, those participating in
a crime were guilty in varying degrees. Thus the actual perpetrator of the crime was the princi-
pal in the first degree; a person who "aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the com-
mission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive" was a principal in the second
degree; one who "aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, ithout
having'been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration" was an
accessory before the fact; and one who "with knowledge of the other's guilt, renders assistance
to a felon in the effort to hinder his detention, arrest, trial or punishment" was an accessory
after the fact. R. PERKINS, supra note 20, at 656, 658, 663, 667.
52. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20 § 65.
53. Id.
54. 17 Ohio St. 583 (1867).
55. Id. at 590.
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Supreme Court answered this question in Stephens v. State 6 when it
determined the liability of an accomplice who waited outside a build-
ing while others committed a robbery and deliberately shot the victim.
The court in Stephens apparently ignored the intent requirement it had
read into the Ohio aggravated murder statute in Robbins 7 and held
the aider and abettor guilty of a killing done in the execution of a com-
mon plan to commit robbery, simply because the killing was a natural
and probable result of an attempt to rob the victim." The Stephens
court was unable to cite any Ohio authority for its holding, but the
court buttressed its opinion by referring to several commentators and
cases in other jurisdictions that contrary to the Robbins decision, clearly
applied the common law felony murder rule to the principal as well as
to accomplices. 9 The majority of Ohio courts have approached accom-
plice liability in the manner of Stephens, by simply ignoring the ques-
tion of the accused accomplice's intent.60
Ohio courts that have expressly considered the issue of the accom-
plice's intent in felony murder cases have applied two divergent theories
to reach a result consistent with the Stephens case. In State v. Pafy,6'
the accused was the driver for a small group that had committed two
previous robbery-assaults. During the course of a third attempt, the victim
suffered a fatal stab wound. In upholding the defendant's first-degree
murder conviction, the court apparently accepted the argument that
intent was a requirement for the aider and abettor's conviction62 but
56. 42 Ohio St. 150 (1884). The aiding and abetting statute at that time was I MK CURWIN,
REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO § 6804 (1854), which read: "Whoever aids abets or procures
another to commit any offense, may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender."
57. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text supra.
58. 42 Ohio St. at 150. The court made no factual inquiry into the actual probability that it
killing would occur.
59. The question of intent does not appear to have been raised in these cases; it is unknown
whether the jury was instructed on the question of purpose to kill, found the defendant guilty,
and then had its determination upheld on review through the appellate court's acceptance of the
"natural and probable consequences" theory. See United States v. Ross, 27 F. Cas, 899
(C.C.D.R.I. 1859) (No. 16,196); People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560 (1875); People v. Pool, 27 Cal,
573 (1865); Stipp v. State, 11 Ind. 62 (1858); State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477 (1859); State v. Nash,
7 Iowa 346 (1858); 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 363 (7th ed. 1882); 2 F. WHARTON, CRINInNAtL
LAW § 998 (7th ed. 1874).
60. See State v. Doty, 94 Ohio St. 258 (1916); Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52 (1906); Coins
v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457 (1889); State v. Halleck, 24 Ohio App. 2d 74 (1970); State v. Laswcll,
78 Ohio App. 202 (1946); State v. Rogers, 64 Ohio App. 39, 27 N.E.2d 791 (1938); State v. Strong,
12 Ohio Dec. 701 (1902); Wilson v. State, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 478 (1928). See also Black v. State, 103
Ohio St. 434 (1921) (defendants found guilty of manslaughter for natural and probable results
of their acts). Cf Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277 (1893) (absent a prior conspiracy or
some other overt act purposely inciting one joining in a fight, each participant liable only for his
own actions).
61. 11 Ohio App. 2d 142, 229 N.E.2d 76 (Summit County 1967).
62. The Palfy court must have found intent to be an element of the crime for an aider and
abettor because in paragraph two of the syllabus it stated that "[a]n intent to kill by the
aider and abettor may be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such circumstances."
Id. at 143 (syllabus 2).
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held that "[a] person engaged in a common design with others to rob by
force and violence various individuals of their property is presumed to
acquiesce in whatever may be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
object of the enterprise."6
The court in State v. Trocodaro,64 however, went further to hold
the intent element of first-degree murder inapplicable to accomplices.
In Trocodaro, two men abducted a woman with the intent to commit
robbery. The defendant discovered that he knew the woman and
protested when the other man wanted to kill her. Despite an agree-
ment to leave the victim tied up in a nearby field, the latter participant
murdered her. The Trocodaro court, in upholding the conviction of
the defendant who protested the killing, said: "Where .. .there has
been found to be criminal conspiracy, it need not be proved that an
aider and abettor also possessed those individual elements needed to
establish the crime against the perpetrator of the act. 65
63. Id. (syllabus 2) (emphasis added).
64. 36 Ohio App. 2d 1, 301 N.E.2d 898 (Franklin Cdunty 1973).
65. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). According to W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 65.
the scope of the doctrines of complicity and conspiracy is a source of continuing confusion.
Although complicity and conspiracy have been considered to be coextensive in some jurisdic-
tions, the authors consider the better view to be that 'aiding should mean something more than
the attenuated connection resulting solely from membership in a conspiracy and the objective
standard of what is reasonably foreseeable.'" Id. at 514 (quoting 1 NATIONAL CONIstissloN O%
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, Working Papers 156 (1970)).
The Ohio Revised Code recognizes conspiracy as both an independent crime and a basis for
complicity liability. According to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.01(A) (Page 1975). the state
of mind for the independent conspiracy offense is defined as: "purpose to commit or to promote
or facilitate the commission of aggravated murder or . . . aggravated robbery. . . ." Section
2923.01(J)(1) states that conspiracy is "[a] felony of the first degree, when one of the objects of
the conspiracy is aggravated murder or murder." As further evidence that conspiracy is an
independent offense, § 2923.01(G) provides that "[wlhen a person is convicted of. . . a
specific offense or of complicity . . . he shall not be convicted of conspiracy involving the same
offense." Yet conspiracy may also be the underlying basis for a complicity conviction. Section
2923.03(A) provides that "[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the
commission of an offense, shall . . . (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in viola-
tion of section 2923.01 [aggravated murder]. . . ." (emphasis added).
In a memorandum dated November 14, 1966 from the Legislative Service Commission to
the Criminal Law Technical Committee (in the possession of Professor Lawrence Herman of The
Ohio State University College of Law) that initially drafted the bill revising the Ohio Criminal
Code, the Commission expressed the opinion that, "It might be a better solution [to the problem
of the scope of accomplice accountability] to ask whether the defendant aided, abetted or soli-
cited the offense charged, rather than relying on the broader concept of conspiracy." The
draft of the complicity section approved by the Criminal Law Technical Committee contained
no provision that made conspiracy a basis for accomplice liability. Minutes of the Criminal
Law Technical Committee meeting, January 30, 1967 (in the possession of Professor Lawrence
Herman of The Ohio State University College of Law).
The conspiracy provision was added in the legislature. In the Comments to Proposed Sec-
tion 2923.03, Onlo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE CO.MMISSION, PROPOSED O1110 CRIMINAL CODE,
1971, the Commission stated that
Courts in Ohio accept the principle that involvement in a conspiracy is sufficient to
charge each conspirator with acts of the principal in furtherance of the conspiracy. See,
State v. Doty . . . .The courts have often noted that "those engaged in a common
enterprise are each responsible for the acts of the other in pursuance of the common
enterprise."
This language, however, was not incorporated into the official committee comments. See 01!o
REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 Committee Comments (Page 1975).
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In its 1974 revision of the Ohio Criminal Code,66 the legislature
added the phrase "acting with the kind of culpability required for
the commission of an offense" to the complicity statute. This specific
statutory language would appear to avoid the anomaly of allowing the
conviction of a defendant for aiding and abetting aggravated murder
when the defendant did not have the intent necessary to hold a principal
guilty of the same offense. However, the court in Lockett relied
heavily upon the Legislative Service Commission's Committee Com-
ment to the complicity statute in arriving at its holding concerning
defendant's intention to commit aggravated murder. The Committee
Comments are dubious authority for the Lockett court's interpretation
of the complicity statute because they do not specifically refer to the
intent element of aider and abettor liability, but rather state generally
that "[t]his section essentially codifies existing case law. .. .,67 More-
over, in view of the contradictory body of case law concerning the
question of intent that was in existence before the reenactment of the
current criminal code, it is entirely unclear from the Committee's
cryptic statement which line of cases it may have been discussing in
its comment.
The Lockett court was equally indiscriminate in its analysis of
prior case law concerning intent as a prerequisite to aider and abettor
liability. In its review of the "common law," the court quoted language
from State v. Doty,68 a case which, like Stephens, ignored intent and
held a conspirator69 responsible "if the conspired unlawful act and
the manner of its performance would be reasonably likely to produce
death . ,70 In addition, the court in Lockett went on to quote
language from Palfy, in which the accomplice's intent was presumed,
and from Trocodaro, in which intent was not considered an element of
an aider and abettor's offense. 71  Since the court in Lockett failed to
detect the distinctions between the cases upon which it ruled, it is un-
clear whether Lockett holds that intent is not required as in Trocodaro
or whether it is to be presumed as in Palfy.72
66. See note 15 supra.
67. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 60, 358 N.E.2d at 1071. It is possible that this language refers to the
acts giving rise to complicity liability rather than to the mental element.
68. 94 Ohio St. 258, 113 N.E. 811 (1916).
69. See note 66 supra.
70. 49 Ohio St. at 60-61, 358 N.E.2d at 1071.
71. Id. at 61-62, 358 N.E.2d at 1071-72.
72. Although there is scant difference between ignoring intent and considering it not to be
required, there is a definite distinction between ignoring intent and finding that intent as a
requirement for accomplice liability will be "presumed." The distnction between ignoring and
presuming intent gains significance under Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See
text accompanying notes 128-135 infra. Patterson holds that although a state legislature is
empowered with much discretion to define the elements of a crime, each element that is re-
quired must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 205-06. When a court uses a con-
clusive presumption, it recognizes that the element of the crime in question is indeed a require-
ment, but one that need not be proved in a particular case. MCCORMICK'S, supra note 38,
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Adding to this ambiguity is the court's statement in the syllabus
that "a purposeful intent to kill by the aider and abettor may be found
to exist beyond a reasonable doubt" 73 and its extensive discussion, in
the opinion, of the evidence presented to prove Lockett's intention to
kill. Despite the court's reliance on opinions that ignore intent or hold
it inapplicable, the court must have considered purpose to kill an
important determinant of accomplice liability, or it would not have
devoted so much of its opinion to a discussion of Lockett's intent.
7 4
The result in Lockett is consistent with the common law theory of
accomplice liability-that liability extends to the natural and probable
consequences of the offense." A different result for aiders and abettors
should be expected, however, under Ohio law, which provides that an
aider and abettor may be charged as a principal under the terms of
the principal offense and subjected to the same penalty, 76 and specific-
ally states in the complicity statute, that an aider and abettor's liability
is dependent upon the same subjective intent that would be necessary
to find the principal guilty. Given the Ohio statutory language, all
of the elements of that principal offense should be proved for a con-
viction of the accused aider and abettor. It would be an anomaly
indeed if less stringent standards were applied to a complicitor than a
principal.
Furthermore, as noted previously,77 "purposely" is defined in the
Ohio Revised Code as a "specific intention to cause a particular result.
§ 342. A conclusive presumption of an express statutory requirement is directly within the aegis
of Patterson (as is a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant), and
is therefore unconstitutional. 432 U.S. at 215. The outcome is exactly opposite, however,
if the court construes the statute not to contain the requirement in question, because statutory
contents are a matter of legislative discretion according to Patterson. Id. at 210.
In view of the phrasing of the Ohio complicity statute, however, it is questionable whether
the court could constitutionally hold that intent is not required. In Bovie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of a
new construction of a statute deprived the defendants of their right to fair warning of a criminal
prohibition, in violation of due process.
73. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 49, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 4).
74. If the court's opinion is interpreted to require that an aider and abettor's intent to
commit aggravated murder must be proved, the court did not clearly indicate whether the jury
is to be required or merely permitted to find purpose to kill in the presence of a common plan to
commit a felony by the use of weapon likely to produce death. Id. at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072.
75. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
76. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (Page 1975) provides:
(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the
accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an
offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender. A
charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal
offense.
According to the Legislative Service Commission's Committee Comments following the statute,
"[a]ccomplices are liable to prosecution and punishment as principal offenders. For example,
an accomplice to aggravated murder is liable to the death penalty the same as the actual
murderer."
77. See text accompanying notes 46-58 supra.
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S..,,78 Yet the Lockett court held that evidence of reckless conduct
was sufficient to prove specific intention: "Under these circumstances a
killing might be reasonably expected., 79  Under the Ohio Criminal
Code a person "acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to
the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his con-
duct is likely to be of a certain nature."80  Negligence is defined
under the Ohio Revised Code as "a substantial lapse from due care"
during which a person "failed to perceive or avoid a risk that his con-
duct may cause a certain result. . . ."" Regardless whether the Ohio
Supreme Court would label a killing that may be "reasonably ex-
pected" to be reckless or negligent conduct, it is obvious that the court
has reduced the intent requirement for complicity in aggravated mur-
der below the statutory definition of "purpose." Such a broad expan-
sion of liability based on reckless behavior for a crime to which the
death penalty12 may attach directly contravenes one of the primary
goals of the criminal justice system, i.e., to attach the highest penalty
to the most criminally culpable conduct.8 3  Reckless conduct is more
appropriately penalized as involuntary manslaughter? 4 than as aggra-
vated murder.
78. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(A) (Page 1975) quoted at note 5 supra,
79. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072.
80. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (Page 1975) quoted at iote 5 supra,
81. Id. § 2901.22(D), quoted at note 5 supra.
82. Justice Stem, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the "imposition of the death
penalty .. . is both arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the crime." 49 Ohio St. 2d at 71,
385 N.E.2d at 1077.
Whether the United States Supreme Court would hold the death penalty unconstitutional
in this situation is unclear. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall said in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that the death penalty is unconstitutional under all circumstances.
In the same case, Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took the position that since
the death penalty has been adjudged constitutional in the past, it is the legislature's job to
decide whether it comports with modem standards of cruel and unusual punishment. The
other members of the Court have preferred to decide on a case by case basis. In the decisions
after Furman, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), it has been established that the death penalty is not
invariably cruel and unusual nor is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is
imposed. But in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), four members of the Court (Mr.
Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Stevens)
concluded that the death penalty for rqpe is grossly disproportionate and excessive. Mr. Justice
Powell felt it was disproportionate because no life had been taken 'and the victim did not
sustain serious or lasting injury. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Mr. Justice
Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall reiterated their previous positions.
Although a death did occur in Lockett, it was not caused by the hand of Sandra Lockett,
Moreover, the statutory intent requirements for both the principal and Lockett were only
constructively fulfilled. Therefore, Lockett is a case in which the death penalty is grossly
disproportionate and excessive. For a closer examination of the issues surrounding the im-
position of the death penalty, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Ohio's Death Penaly', 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 617 (1977).
83. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 20, §§ 6, 73. See also State v. Robbins, 8 Ohio
St. 131, 179 (1857).
84. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Page 1975) provides:
(A) No person shall cause the death of another as a pror;imate result of the of-
fender's committing or attempting to commit a felony.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE Lockett OPINION
The Lockett court did not make it clear whether a jury would be
required or merely permitted to find that the principal had the requisite
intent based upon the evidence presented at trial. 5  The court was
even less clear whether the complicity statute required the aider and
abettor's intent to be proved and, if intent were an essential element
of the offense, whether the jury would be required or permitted to find
that the accomplice shared the principal's intent to kill. Because of
this ambiguity, it is necessary to consider the constitutional aspects
of the court's holding in light of four possible interpretations of the
court's treatment of the evidence pertaining to Lockett's intent to kill.
The court may have held the evidence created (1) a permissive in-
ference, (2) a presumption that did not shift the burden of producing
evidence, (3) a presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion, or
(4) a conclusive presumption.
A. Permissive Inference of Intent and Presumption That Does
Not Shift the Burden of Producing Evidence
The Lockett court held in the body of its opinion, that, because
the evidence "established that the participants . . . entered into a
common design to rob . . . by the use of force, violence and a deadly
weapon," there was "sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find
a purposeful intent to kill '86 on the part of the principal. As to the
intent of the aider and abettor, the court stated in its syllabus that
"[ilf a conspired robbery . . . would be reasonably likely to produce
death, each person engaged in the common design . . . is guilty . . . .
and a purposeful intent to kill by the aider and abettor may be found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .,T One interpretation of this
language is that the court was merely allowing an inference of de-
fendant's intent based solely on the facts and circumstances of this
particular case. A court makes a permissive inference when it uses
ordinary reasoning to determine that sufficient evidence has been pro-
duced to satisfy the prosecutor's burden of producing evidence on an
issue;88 constitutional limitations on the use of permissive inferences
have not yet been clearly and completely developed. 89
(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result to the of-
fender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Viola-
tion of Division (A) of this section is a felony of the first degree. Violation of Division
(B) of this section is a felony of the first degree. Violation of Division (B) of this section
is a felony of the third degree.
85. See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
86. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 60, 358 N.E.2d at 1071.
87. Id. at 49, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 4).
88. McCoRMIcK's, supra note 38, § 342.
89. Id. § 344.
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The court in Lockett focused on a narrow but standardized set of
facts that had been relied upon in prior cases to support a finding
of sufficient evidence of intent.90 Although this focus strongly suggests
that the court was employing something more than a mere inference,
some commentators do not consider the use of a narrow but standard-
ized set of facts that satisfy a party's burden of producing evidence
to be a presumption, but reserve that term for a device that shifts the
burden of persuasion as well.9' The exact nature of a presumption
has been the source of much confusion.92 According to Thayer, a
presumption is essentially "an act or process which aids and shortens
inquiry and argument. . . . In the view of Wigmore, "[a] pre-
sumption . .. is in its characteristic feature a rule of lawE94 laid down
by the judge, and attaching to one evidentiary fact certain procedural
consequences as to the duty of production of other evidence by the
opponent."' A presumption arises, in Thayer's opinion, when:
a certain primafacie effect is given to particular facts, and it is not merely
given to them once, by one judge, on a single occasion, but it is imputed
to them habitually, and by a rule which is followed by all judges, and
recommended to juries; and even laid down to juries as the binding rule
of law.
96
Whether an evidentiary device that is used to satisfy a party's bur-
den of producing evidence is labelled a standardized inference or a
presumption, 97 there are constitutional due process requirements con-
cerning the degree of relationship between the fact established by the
prosecution and the presumed fact. The United States Supreme Court
has endeavored to articulate a due process standard to govern the
requisite degree of relationship for federal statutory criminal pre-
sumptions. 98 These federal statutory presumptions are analogous to
the Lockett presumptions to the extent that the court's use of a narrow
90. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
91. See generally MCCORMICK'S, supra note 38, § 342. Cf. Laughlin, supra note 38, at
203 (stating that the use of a standardized set of facts is a presumption).
92. MCCORMICK'S, supra note 38, § 342.
93. J. THAYER, supra note 38, at 315.
94. "By the expedient of making the rule a prima facie one, the courts may have seemed
to themselves to abstain from legislation, and to be keeping within the region of mere ad-
ministration of existing law. And yet it is clear that this is true legishttion." Id, at 316,
95. J. WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2491 at 288.
96. J. THAYER, supra note 38, at 316.
97. The term "presumption" will be used in this section for the sake of convenience.
98. For a discussion of these cases, see McCoRMICK'S, supra note 38, § 344; Abrams,
Statutory Presumptions and the Federal Criminal Law: A Suggested Analysis, 22 VAND, L.
REv. 1135 (1969); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Crininal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Hug, Presumptions and Inferences In
Criminal Law, 56 MIL. L. REv. 81 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionalitv of Statutory Crintinal
Presumptions, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 141 (1966); Note, Criminal Presumption and Inf'rence
Instructions, 6 WILLAMtrE L.J. 497 (1971).
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but standardized fact pattern-common design to commit a felony with
the use of a deadly weapon-may be interpreted by courts in subsequent
cases as a rule of law to determine when evidence of intent to kill
sufficient to sustain a conviction has been presented by the prosecution.
The first modem Supreme Court opinion to address the constitu-
tional limitations on criminal presumptions was Tot v. United States."
In Tot, a provision of the Federal Firearms Act provided that "the
possession of a firearm . . . by any . . . person who has been con-
victed of a crime of violence shall be presumptive evidence that such
firearm was . . . received by such person in violation of this Act., °°
The Court held this presumption to be violative of due process, ex-
plaining that "a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be
no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbi-
trary because of lack of connection between the two in common ex-
perience."'O'
In the 1965 case of United States v. Gainey,102 the Supreme Court
used the Tot "rational connection" test to uphold the statutory rule that
presence at an illegal still, in the absence of explanation, could be
presumptive evidence that the accused was carrying on the business of
distilling without giving bond. °3  Yet in United States v. Romano,'
also decided in 1965, the Court struck down the statutory presumption
that the presence of an accused at an illegal still could be sufficient to
prove the defendant's possession, custody, or control of the still. The
Court stated that:
Presence tells us only that the defendant was there and very likely played
a part in the illicit scheme. But presence tells us nothing about what the
defendant's specified function was and carries no legitimate, rational or
reasonable inference that he was engaged in one of the specialized func-
tions connected with possession, rather than in one of the supply, de-
livery or operational activities having nothing to do with possession.t
us
The Court in Leary v. United States"°6 required a degree of rela-
tionship somewhat greater than rational connection between the
established fact and the presumed one. The statute in Leary provided
that unexplained possession of marijuana was presumptive evidence
that the possessor knew it was illegally imported. The Court said:
99. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 902(0, repealed Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 234 (1968).
101. 319 U.S. at 467-68.
102. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
103. 380 U.S. at 76. Mr. Justice Black dissented, contending that a presumption deprises
the defendant of his right to remain silent since he is forced to rebut the facts that are pre-
sumed. Id. at 87-88 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
105. Id. at 141.
16,3. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal
statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary,"
and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from
the proved fact on which it is made to depend. w
In In re Winship,'0 the Court held that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."' 0 9 Although Winship did not deal with criminal
presumptions, the Court's reasoning implies that a presumed fact
comprising an element of the crime must follow beyond a reasonable
doubt from the established fact, because criminal presumptions re-
lieve the prosecution of producing evidence."10 The Supreme Court,
however, has never unequivocally applied Winship to presumptions.
The Court seemed to grapple with the effect of Winship in Turner v.
United States... by referring several times to a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard for criminal presumptions. 12  In Turner the Court
dealt with a statutory provision that from possession of heroin or
cocaine the jury could presume that the possessor knew the drug was
imported. After an extensive review of the literature'1 the Court,
upholding the presumption that the possessor must have known that
heroin was imported," 4 said, "We have no reasonable doubt that at
the present time heroin is not produced in this country and that
therefore the heroin Turner had was smuggled heroin."'" Neverthe-
less, the Court struck down this same presumption with respect to
cocaine because it could not be "sufficiently sure either that the cocaine
that Turner possessed came from abroad or that Turner must have
known that it did."'" 6 The Court referred to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard but declined to adopt it as the constitutional standard
for all criminal presumptions.
In a subsequent case, Barnes v. United States,' 7 the Court strongly
107. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
108. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
109. Id. at 364.
110. MCCORMICK'S, supra note 38, § 344.
111. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
112. Id. at 405, 406, 408. Christie and Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal
Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919 (1970), contend that the court adopted the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test in Turner.
113. In MCCORMICK'S, supra note 38, § 344, the authors suggest that if there are sub-
stantial empirical data in the legislative record to support a statutory presumption, the beyond
a reasonable doubt test may be satisfied, and a statutory presumption based on those data
should be sustained.
114. 396 U.S. at 408.
115. Id. at 408.
116. Id. at 419.
117. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
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indicated its preference for a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
but still declined specifically to adopt that standard. The question in
Barnes was whether, from possession of recently stolen property, it
could be presumed that the possessor knew the property had been
stolen." 8 The Court, searching for the correct standard, held:
What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a
statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support convic-
tion satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence neces-
sary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the
inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-
not standard, then it clearly accords with due process."9
The Court went on to say that "common sense and experience tell
us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high proba-
bility that the checks were stolen."'
120
The threshold requirement for the presumptions in Lockett is,
therefore, the "more likely than not" standard. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that participation in a common design to rob with the use
of a weapon likely to produce death was sufficient evidence of the princi-
pal's intent; there was sufficient evidence of the accomplice's intent
because under these circumstances a killing might "reasonably be ex-
pected."' 2' The United States Supreme Court's articulated constitu-
tional standard for presumptions appears to require a much higher
degree of relationship between established and presumed fact than
"likely" and "reasonably likely." Furthermore, although the Supreme
Court has failed to explicitly endorse the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard for criminal presumptions, it seems intuitively doubtful that
any standard short of "beyond a reasonable doubt" should suffice when
the life of the accused is at stake.
B. Conclusive Presumptions and Presumptions That Shift The
Burden of Persuasion
In its syllabus, the Lockett court held that "a homicide occurring
during the commission of a felony is a natural and probable conse-
quence of the common plan which must be presumed to have been
intended ... by the principal. In the body of its opinion, the
court held that an accomplice "is bound by 'all the consequences
naturally and probably arising from the furtherance of the conspiracy
to commit the robbery." 23 The court's use of the language "must be
118. Id. at 838.
119. Id. at 943.
120. Id. at 845.
121. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072.
122. Id at 48, 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (syllabus 3) (emphasis added).
123. Id at 62, 358 N.E.2d at 1072 (emphasis added).
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presumed" and "is bound" implies that the jury had no choice but to
find that the defendant intended to commit aggravated murder. In-
deed, the dissent labelled the presumption of the aider and abettor's
intent a "conclusive judicial presumption."12 4  A conclusive, or irrebut-
table, presumption is patently unconstitutional because it would in
effect deny the accused a trial by jury.125
Yet even when one assumes that the court in Lockett could not
have intended a clearly unconstitutional result, the quoted language
places upon the defendant an extremely high burden of proof.,2 6 In
order to avoid conviction, the defendant bears the burden of persuad-
ing the jury of his innocence.
Two very recent Supreme Court decisions address the constitu-
tionality of presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant in a criminal case: Mullaney v. Wilbur'27 and Patterson v.
New York.128  The overall effect of these two opinions is to recognize
broad legislative discretion to define the elements of a crime, but to
require each element that the legislature, or the courts in interpreting
the statute, prescribes to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the State may not employ a presumption that shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove the nonoccurrence of
one of the essential elements of the crime.
The Court in Mullaney held that because malice aforethought was
an express requirement for a conviction of murder under the Maine
statute, it was a denial of due process for the trial judge to instruct the
jury that malice aforethought would be implied conclusively unless the
defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he had
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 129 The Court held
the shifting of the burden of persuasion to be unconstitutional. It
124. Id. at 70, 358 N.E.2d at 1076 (Stem, J., dissenting).
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. . [and] to be confronted
with the witnesses in his favor . . ." See MCCoRMICK'S supra note 311, § 342.
A recent West Virginia Supreme Court decision, Pinkerton v. Forr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va.
1975), lends additional support to the argument that a conclusive presumption of an essential
element of aider and abettors liability is unconstitutional. The court in Pinkerton, on the
basis of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), held
that a statutory presumption that the accused is guilty of conspiracy when he is proved guilty
along with others of felonious assault destroys the presumption of innocence and is violative of
due process under both the West Virginia and federal constitutions. Id. at 685.
126. See note 38 supra.
127. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Although the Court narrowly construed the scope of the
Mullaney opinion in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), it nevertheless held
Mullaney to be retroactive and reversed the petitioner's conviction in Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240 (1977), based upon the North Carolina Supreme Court's de-
termination that the trial court had shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant, con-
trary to Mullaney.
128. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
129. Ohio has a special statute that allocates the burden of proof. Omo REv. Coon
ANN. § 2901.05 (Page 1975) provides: "(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed
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distinguished the presumption in Mullaney from presumptions that
merely aid the prosecution to meet its burden of producing evidence,
which are subject to the due process requirements established by
Barnes and Turner.1 30  The Court dispelled any doubt that Mullaney
was applicable to the issue of a defendant's intent: "[Intent] may be
established by adducing evidence of the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the homicide. And although intent is
typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify
shifting the burden to him."'
3
'
The Court in Patterson upheld the New York practice of burden-
ing the defendant in a murder trial with proving the affirmative defense
of extreme emotional disturbance because the prosecution was required
to prove the elements of the New York murder statute-death, intent
and causation-beyond a reasonable doubt without the aid of any pre-
sumptions.1 32  The Court, in an opinion that explained Mullaney in
great depth, cautioned that Mullaney should not be read so broadly as
to prohibit a state from allowing the "blameworthiness of an act or the
severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the
presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden
of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be,
beyond a reasonable doubt." 33  Although this pronouncement gives
state legislatures considerable leeway, the Court observed that there are
constitutional limitations: "The legislature cannot 'validly command
that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the
accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts
essential to guilt.' ,034
The effect of Mullaney and Patterson is unmistakable. If Ohio law
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the
prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is on
the accused."
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977)
and State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 111-12, 351 N.E.2d 88, 94 (1976), has construed this
statute to mean that in order for the defendant to raise an affirmative defense, the defendant
must introduce "evidence of a nature and quality sufficient to raise the issue . . . .from whatever
source the evidence may come." Once the accused has done this, it then becomes incumbent
on the prosecution to disprove the affirmative defense, justification, or excuse beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
130. 421 U.S. at 703. See text accompanying notes 110-122 supra.
131. Id. at 702.
132. The dissent in Patterson criticized the majority for taking a formalistic approach that
"allows a legislature to shift, virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any
factor in a criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in
the statutory language that defines the crime." 432 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
133. The Court's restriction of the Mullaney doctrine was engendered in part by law
review articles that criticized the broad ramifications of Mullaney. See, e.g., Comment,
Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard,
11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 390 (1976); Note, Afflrtnative Defenses in Ohio after Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 36 OHio ST. L.J. 828 (1975).
134. 432 U.S. at 210 (citations omitted).
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requires specific intent to kill, then the state must prove that intent
beyond a reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. The Ohio aggravated murder statute expressly re-
quires purpose, defined as a specific intent to kill, and the courts have
held purpose to be an express requirement for conviction of the
principal.13 5  The Ohio complicity statute specifies "culpability re-
quired for the commission of an offense," but it is unclear whether the
court in Lockett held specific intention to kill to be an express re-
quirement for a complicitor1 36  If the Ohio courts interpret the com-
plicity statute to require intent, yet at the same time permit this re-
quirement to be satisfied by invoking the doctrine that an aider and
abettor is bound by all the consequences, then the result in Lockett
is clearly unconstitutional on the basis of MullaneY and Patterson.1
37
IV. CONCLUSION
Although intent of both principal and complicitor to kill is appar-
ently a statutory prerequisite in Ohio to liability for aiding and abetting
aggravated murder, the state was able to prove those intentions in
Lockett only by the use of an evidentiary device. The ambiguous
language of the Lockett opinion lends itself to four possible interpreta-
tions of the court's treatment of the evidence of intent to kill: the
court might have held that the evidence created (I) a permissive in-
ference, (2) a presumption that did not shift the burden of proof, (3) a
presumption that shifted the burden of proof, or (4) a conclusive pre-
sumption. Although the use of a permissive inference is a common-
place and indispensable tool of the reasoning process, the use of pre-
sumptions in criminal cases requires extreme care, particularly when
the presumption assists the prosecution to obtain conviction of a crime
for which the accused is subject to the death penalty. 38 The interest
of society is scarcely served by convictions that carry penalties dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of criminal acts committed. 139  To
135. See section II.A supra.
136. See section II.B supra.
137. The United States Supreme Court could decide that the Ohio statute, as interpreted
by the Ohio Supreme Court, does not really require intent. In orcler to reach this conclusion,
however, the Court would have to ignore the plain language of the statute. Even were the Court
to accept this construction, there would still be a possible violation of due process in its retro-
active application. See Bovie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
138. For the statutory provision for imposition of the death penalty, see note 8 supra.
For an interesting policy analysis of the utilization of the death penalty in Lockett, see Black,
The Death Penalty Now, 51 TUL. L. REv. 430 (1977).
139. The drafters of THE MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4) Comment (Tent. Draft No. I,
1953) stated:
If the homicidal act was a means to committing or facilitating the robbery, accomplices
in the robbery are accomplices in that act under 3. If, further the intention to commit
a robbery suffices to make homicide a murder, as that crime is legally defined, all ac-
complices in the robbery would be guilty of murder. But should the definition of murder
be altered to demand intent to kill, accomplices could not be hield unless they shared
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discard the Lockett presumptions would not hinder aggravated murder
convictions in cases in which the aider and abettor may indeed have
shared the principal's intention to kill. Without these presumptions
the prosecution could reasonably be required to produce objective,
circumstantial evidence from which it may be inferred beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the accused had the requisite, subjective intent.
The state should try the accused for the crime requiring the state
of mind that the accused did possess. The Lockett dissent expressed
the view that Sandra Lockett might have been guilty of involuntary
manslaughter under the Ohio statute. Given the striking disparity in
penalties between aggravated murder and involuntary manslaughter,
the courts should be extremely reluctant to use presumptions to extend
liability for aggravated murder. A defendant convicted of aggravated
murder with specifications may be sentenced to death unless he or she
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there are mitigating
circumstances that justify nonimposition of the death penalty.' 40
By comparison, a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter may
be sentenced to a maximum term of twenty-five years.'
41
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific intention to kill
does indeed entail more work for the prosecution. Yet a civilized
society most certainly has a duty to ensure that only persons whose
conduct is clearly proscribed by the statute are convicted of a crime
for which death is a possible punishment. 142
Regina Reid
the purpose. Moreover, if homicidal act was not a means to the commission of the
robbery-as if one party shoots an enemy in satisfaction of a merely private grudge-
complicity in robbery would not imply complicity in murder, because it did not compre-
hend the causative behavior.
140. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page 1975), quoted at note 8 supra.
141. Id. § 2929.11(B)(1) (Page 1975). The Court in Mullaney noted the great disparity in
sentences between murder and manslaughter. 421 U.S. at 703.04.
142. As this issue was going to press, the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio,
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